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In the last few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues. In some cases shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value. It is hard to understand this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm based on
shareholder value maximization. We explain how jurisprudence has sustained this
criterion in spite of its economic weaknesses. To overcome these weaknesses we propose the criterion of shareholder welfare maximization and argue that it can better
explain observed behavior. Finally, we outline how shareholder welfare maximization can be implemented in practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, there has been a dramatic increase in
shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues.
Consider the following activity in 2021. Eighty-one percent of
DuPont shareholders approved a proposal requiring the company
to disclose how much plastic the company releases into the environment each year and to assess the effectiveness of DuPont’s pollution policies.1 Sixty-four percent of ExxonMobil shareholders
approved a proposal requiring the company to describe “if, and
how, ExxonMobil’s lobbying activities (direct and through trade
associations) align with the goal of limiting average global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (the Paris Climate Agreement’s goal).”2 Fifty-two percent of Duke Energy shareholders approved a proposal that requests disclosures on contributions to
candidates, parties, committees, and 501(c)(4) organizations.3
Ninety-five percent of Wendy’s shareholders approved a proposal
requiring the company “to disclose concrete evidence on the effectiveness of its Supplier Code of Conduct in protecting the human
rights of workers at its produce and meat suppliers, with respect
to COVID-19 in particular.”4
It is hard to explain this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm in economics, finance, and law. According to the traditional view, shareholders have a single objective:
shareholder value maximization (SVM). There is no scope for any
other goals, including social ones. But in each of the above examples, shareholders seem to be pushing companies to do things that
might reduce value (most of which are opposed by management).
Many scholars have criticized the SVM paradigm, arguing that
managers should act in the interest of other stakeholders — workers, consumers, the community — or that companies
should have a social purpose over and above making money.5
These criticisms are normative. But a further powerful criticism
is a positive one: the paradigm cannot explain what shareholders
are actually pressuring companies to do.
1
Kevin Crowley, DuPont Loses Plastic Pollution Vote With Record 81% Rebellion,
BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/4HCR-2M5N.
2
ExxonMobil Co., Amended Current Report (Form 8-K/A) (May 26, 2021).
3
Andrew Ramonas & Lydia Beyoud, Activist Shareholders Score Wins on Election
Spending After Riot, BLOOMBERG L. (July 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/L9LM-WDNA.
4
The Wendy’s Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 19, 2021).
5
See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER
GOOD (2018); ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH
PURPOSE AND PROFIT (2020). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory
Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020).
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Corporations are larger, more complex, and more powerful
than they were in the 1970s and early 1980s when the traditional
paradigm became established. In a more populous and interdependent world, the importance of externalities has also greatly
increased, and many feel that governments are not dealing with
them. The preferences of investors have changed too.6 Investors,
especially younger ones, are more sensitive to environmental and
social issues. As a result, we think that the paradigm needs to
change. This is true even if one accepts, as we do, the idea of
shareholder primacy, that is, that companies should act on behalf
of shareholders.7 When externalities are important and at least
some investors are prosocial, we argue that shareholders will
want companies to pursue shareholder welfare maximization
(SWM) not SVM.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we reexamine the
case for SVM, highlight the weaknesses of the case, and discuss
why in spite of these weaknesses SVM has survived as a dominant paradigm. Second, we go into more detail about the meaning
of SWM and how it can be implemented.
The paper is structured as follows. We start, in Section II, by
reviewing the traditional case for SVM in a “perfect” world. We
then turn in Section III to the weaknesses of the case when imperfections, including particularly externalities, are introduced.
In Section IV, we discuss how and why SVM became an established norm in spite of its limitations. In Section V, we suggest
that SWM better represents the preferences of shareholders, explaining both how it should be interpreted and how it can be implemented. We argue that versions of SWM are actually being developed and used, as we write. Section VI concludes.
6
For more on this, see Michal Barzuza et al., The Millennial Corporation: Strong
Stakeholders, Weak Managers (Apr. 12, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/T22U-D7NN.
7
The argument for this is standard. Shareholders, as residual income claimants,
are the most vulnerable of the constituencies with which a company deals, and so they are
allocated votes, and courts have determined that managers have a fiduciary duty to act in
their interest. Whereas other groups—consumers, workers, creditors—are protected, at
least partially, by contracts and/or have reasonable exit options (consumers or workers
can quit), shareholders have weak if any contractual protection and can exit only by selling
shares at the market price, which may be low if the company is not being run in their
interest. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Eugene Fama, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, 63 J.
BUS. S71 (1990); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). In some
cases other stakeholder groups are not well protected by contracts and company founders
may choose to allocate votes to these groups. See HANSMANN, supra. However, in most
companies votes are allocated to the residual income claimants, that is, the founders
choose shareholder primacy.
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II. THE CASE FOR SVM
We begin by reviewing the basic argument for SVM. Consider
a perfectly competitive economy where no agent has an effect on
prices. Suppose that there are no externalities and a complete set
of (contingent commodity) markets. Each consumer maximizes
utility subject to her budget constraint. An increase in the value
of one firm increases the wealth of that firm’s shareholders without affecting anybody else’s wealth or prices. Thus the shareholders are better off—their budget constraints move outwards and
they can spend their increased wealth on desirable goods and services—and nobody else is worse off (prices have not changed). It
follows that shareholders unanimously favor SVM (even if they
care about other people).8
A similar logic applies if we think in terms of contracts rather
than markets. Suppose that a firm has contracts with customers,
workers, suppliers, creditors, etc., that perfectly insulate these
groups from any change in the firm’s production decision. Then a
change in production that increases shareholder value makes the
firm’s shareholders better off (the pie is bigger) and nobody worse
off. Again, such a change is unanimously favored by the firm’s
shareholders.
It is worth teasing out a further implication. Under the assumptions just described, shareholder value represents precisely
a firm’s contribution to society, in the sense that if it disappeared
the shareholders would be worse off by this amount and nobody
else would be affected (this is the no-surplus condition9).
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CASE FOR SVM
In reality, competition is not perfect; markets are not complete; and externalities are important. Without giving too much
away, we will argue that the issues raised by imperfect competition and incompleteness put a minor dent in the SVM edifice,
based on shareholder unanimity, while the issues raised by externalities (and social considerations) bring the whole construction
down.

8
Under these conditions it is also the case that SVM leads to a socially (Pareto)
efficient outcome. This is the first theorem of welfare economics. See, e.g., GÉRARD
DEBREU, THE THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
(1959).
9
See Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and the Creativity
of the Market, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 479 (2001).
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A. Imperfect Competition
Suppose that a firm has monopoly power in the goods market
(and cannot perfectly price discriminate). Some of the firm’s
shareholders may purchase and enjoy “consumer surplus” from
its product. If their consumption is large enough they may prefer
the firm to increase output and lower price even if this reduces
profit.10 Or suppose that the firm has monopsony power in the labor market. Some of the firm’s shareholders may be workers who
would prefer the firm to employ more workers, thereby raising
the wage, even if this is not profit-maximizing. Under these conditions, shareholder unanimity will not generally obtain.11
B. Incomplete Markets
When markets are incomplete, a firm’s profit is a random variable. Someone who holds shares may then enjoy a “consumption”
benefit, to the extent that this random variable has risk-return
characteristics that are not already available in the marketplace.12 As a result, some owners may favor a production plan that
provides a particular investment opportunity even if this does not
maximize the firm’s market value. However, Hart shows that this
consumption effect (of a single firm) becomes negligible in a large
economy.13 The reason is that, if one investor enjoys a significant
consumption benefit, so will many other similar investors, and
competition by them will bid up the share price to the point where
the benefit disappears. The consequence is that owners will continue to favor market value maximization.14

10

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Owner-Consumers and Efficiency, 19 ECON. LETTERS 303

(1985).
11 Of course, under imperfect competition, there is also no reason to think that SVM
will lead to a socially efficient outcome.
12 See, e.g., Jacques H. Drèze, Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality,
Equilibrium and Stability, in ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EQUILIBRIUM AND
OPTIMALITY 129 – 66 (Jacques H. Drèze ed., 1974).
13 Oliver Hart, On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies, 47
ECONOMETRICA 1057 (1979).
14 Even though shareholders may favor SVM, SVM will typically not lead to a (constrained) Pareto optimal outcome in a multi-good/multi-period incomplete markets economy since firms’ production decisions affect relative prices, which in turn can affect the
degree of market incompleteness. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium
When the Market Structure Is Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 418 (1975); John D.
Geanakoplos & Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity, and Constrained
Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations When the Asset Market Is Incomplete, in
UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH J.
ARROW, VOLUME III (Walter P. Heller et al. eds., 1986).
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C. Common Ownership
These days many shareholders hold diversified portfolios, often through indexed funds. Such shareholders will want the total
value of their portfolio maximized rather than the value of a single firm. This may lead shareholders to push for firms to be less
competitive and at an extreme engage in monopoly pricing since
this increases total profit in an industry.15 Common ownership
does not necessarily destroy the unanimity result but does suggest that shareholders may favor something other than SVM.
D. Externalities and Social Considerations
The deviations from the unanimity result described in Sections III.A and III.B seem “second-order.” As evidence, we are not
aware of cases where shareholders have pushed firms to reduce
prices because the shareholders consume the product, or to choose
a production plan with risk-return characteristics that are not already available in the market. There is one important exception.
Workers whose pension plans consist of shares have in recent
years pushed companies to treat workers better, and this trend
may grow.16
Concerning Section III.C, the common ownership monopolization effect is hotly debated, and the jury is still out about its
empirical significance.17
In this section we turn to a set of considerations and departures that we believe are of first-order importance. They are also
15 This was pointed out some years ago by Julio J. Rotemberg, Financial Transactions Costs and Industrial Performance (Alfred P. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper
No. 1554 – 84, 1984), and Roger Gordon, Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?, ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, June 12, 2003, at 1. It was emphasized
recently by José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513
(2018).
16 For an example of how labor union pension funds use their votes to pursue worker
interests, see Ashwini Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187 (2012).
17 Azar et al., supra note 15, find that prices of domestic airline tickets are 3% to 7%
higher than they would have been if airlines had no common shareholders. José Azar et
al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition, 51 FIN. MGMT. 227 (2022), document comparable results in the U.S. banking industry. The first paper has been challenged by Patrick J. Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the
Airline Industry, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2022), who document that the positive correlation
between common ownership and ticket prices is driven by variation in airline market
shares rather than variation in institutional ownership. The second paper has been challenged by Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2017-029, 2017), who document that the effects of common
ownership on prices and quantities of deposits are fairly small.

2022]

The New Corporate Governance

201

ones that seem to underly the large and rapidly increasing shareholder activity that has occurred in recent years. They involve externalities and, in most cases, the idea that individuals care about
others as well as themselves, that is, they are socially responsible.
Externalities do not alter the logic of Section II that shareholders will favor SVM as long as the government has implemented an optimal tax policy. Suppose firms cause environmental
harm, e.g., pollution, but that a firm must compensate each affected person by the (marginal) damage incurred. Then the previous arguments go through. An increase in market value net of the
tax makes shareholders better off and no one worse off, since everybody is compensated for the harm they experience.
But what happens if the government has not regulated optimally, a particular concern when an externality is global, as with
climate change, and coordination by many governments is required for optimal mitigation?18
A dominant view over the last fifty years has been that even
this does not disturb the SVM prescription. One might call this
the Friedman separation theorem.19 To understand the argument,
suppose that, in the absence of an optimal tax policy, the Sierra
Club is doing valuable work to preserve the environment. Assume
that the shareholders of a firm care about the environment either
because environmental harm affects them directly or because
they are socially responsible and care about the harm to others.
Might the shareholders want their firm to reduce dividend payments and make a charitable contribution to the Sierra Club? The
answer, at least according to Friedman, is no. The same outcome—a contribution to the Sierra Club—can be achieved if the
firm pays out the higher dividend and each shareholder makes
their own contribution to the Sierra Club. Given that individual
shareholders can do anything the firm can do, it still makes sense
for the firm to maximize profit, and for individual shareholders to
engage in public welfare activities themselves (we revisit this argument in Section V).

18 Even if the government does not regulate externalities optimally, an efficient class
action system that allows all parties negatively affected by an externality to be compensated appropriately could achieve the same result. In practice, however, class actions are
very expensive and cannot easily be organized across legal jurisdictions. In addition, informational asymmetries and limited liability make this system ineffective. See Roy
Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The Dupont Case (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23866, 2017), https://perma.cc/6MS5-2R4F.
19 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://perma.cc/TU2U-FJUE.
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Unfortunately, the Friedman separation theorem is not general. Charitable contributions are a very special case. Charitable
contributions are separable from a firm’s other activities and a
firm has no comparative advantage in making them relative to
individuals.20 But in many cases a firm’s damage-inducing (or
benefit-generating) activities are inseparable from its production
activities, and under these conditions the separation theorem no
longer holds.21
The following examples, two of which have already been mentioned in the introduction, help to illustrate the point.
(i) DuPont generates large quantities of plastic waste. Reducing the waste would improve the environment but reduce
profit.
(ii) Costco uses antibiotics in raising chickens. This is profitable but is a major cause of the development of antibiotic resistance, a problem that costs human lives and billions of dollars in healthcare costs.22
(iii) Danco Laboratories LLC is the US distributor of the abortifacent drug Mifeprex (an abortion pill), better known as RU486A.23 Danco is privately held, but one can imagine some
shareholders, who are anti-abortion, wanting Danco to scale
back its activities even though this would reduce profit.
(iv) Duke Energy, like many companies, makes contributions
or expenditures on behalf of political candidates and parties.
Disclosing these contributions could be good for American democracy but might reduce share value.24

20 Sometimes even charitable contributions are not easily separable from the business activities of a corporation. Consider for instance impact investment funds run by asset managers who are very knowledgeable about the areas in which gifts are made.
21 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L., FIN., & ACCT. 247 (2017).
22 Stop Using Antibiotics in Healthy Animals to Prevent the Spread of Antibiotic Resistance, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/F76Z-ZZPN.
23 Sharon Bernstein, Persistence Brought Abortion Pill to U.S., L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5,
2000), https://perma.cc/629W-MKRX.
24 See Saumya Prabhat & David M. Primo, Risky Business: Do Disclosure and Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Contributions Affect Firm Performance?, 21 BUS. &
POL. 205 (2019); Christopher Poliquin & Young Hou, The Value of Corporate Political Donations: Evidence from the Capitol Riot (Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/3CZ3-CH3G.
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The first thing to notice about these examples is that separability does not hold: shareholders cannot easily replicate (or undo)
the firm’s decision. It would be very costly for individual shareholders to clean up the plastic waste produced by DuPont, and it
is unclear how they can offset Costco’s antibiotic usage, Duke Energy’s political contributions, or Danco’s distribution of RU-486A.
In principle, a coalition of shareholders or other citizens could negotiate a desirable outcome with one of the firms, e.g., a coalition
could bribe DuPont to choose a technology that reduces plastic
waste. But assembling such a coalition runs into serious freerider problems: each person would prefer others to be in the coalition. In contrast, if Dupont itself chooses a less-polluting technology, all shareholders are forced to pay their pro-rata share of
the cost and the free-rider problem is eliminated.25
Second, in these examples, there is no reason to suppose that
SVM is unanimously favored by shareholders. In (i), some shareholders may favor a less-polluting technology because plastic
waste affects them directly or because they care about the effect
of the waste on others; other shareholders may not be personally
affected or may care less about the welfare of others, and so would
like to stick to the current technology. In (ii), some shareholders
may want to reduce the use of antibiotics because of the public
health threat to them or others or because antimicrobial resistance reduces the profits of other companies in their portfolio;26
others, being less concerned by the personal threat, putting less
weight on others, and not having a diversified portfolio, may support the current strategy. In (iii), some shareholders may not care
about the abortion issue, or may favor greater access to abortion,
and will therefore support the wide distribution of RU-486A; others may be anti-abortion and regard the distribution of the pill as
a sin. In (iv), some shareholders may care a lot about the threat
to American democracy, while others may be more concerned
about financial return.
There is also no reason to think that SVM achieves a socially
efficient outcome among the group of shareholders as a whole (or
for society). If the disutility environmentally-sensitive
25 For more on this, see Eleonora Broccardo et al., Exit vs. Voice, J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2022).
26 The idea that the shareholders of one firm may be concerned about the impact of
that firm’s externalities on the profitability of other firms the shareholders own is at the
center of the growing literature on universal ownership. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2022); Ellen Quigley, Universal Ownership
in the Anthropocene (Feb. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/K43K4UAC.
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shareholders experience from Dupont’s plastic waste exceeds the
profit the waste generates, SVM leads to the production of the
plastic waste even though it would be efficient for the shareholders as a group to eliminate the waste.27
It is very important to note that there is no neutral outcome
in these examples. Friedman and others have suggested that a
deviation from profit or value maximization imposes a tax on
(some) shareholders.28 For instance, in (i), if socially responsible
shareholders persuade management to reduce the plastic waste
this imposes a tax on those who favor profit maximization. This
may be true but it is equally true that, if less socially responsible
shareholders persuade management not to reduce the waste, this
imposes a tax on the socially responsible shareholders.
It is also worth noting that deviations from profit maximization are neither “left-wing” nor “right-wing”. In (i), (ii) and (iv),
the deviation may be regarded as left-wing, while in (iii) it may
be thought of as right-wing. In the same way, profit maximization
is neither right-wing nor left-wing. In (i), (ii) and (iv), it may be
thought of as right-wing, while in (iii) it may be regarded as leftwing. Profit maximization is amoral, not immoral.
Our conclusion is this. To the extent that examples like these
are widespread, and we believe that they are, there is nothing
special about SVM: there is no reason to think that it will be
unanimously favored or will deliver the right outcome among a
firm’s shareholders as a whole. What to put in its place? We believe that companies should pursue shareholder welfare maximization (SWM) not SVM, and that a shareholder vote on issues like
those in examples (i)-(iv) is one way to implement this.29 We consider this further in Section V. But first we turn to why SVM, in
spite of its defects, has become the norm.
IV. WHY DID SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION BECOME THE
NORM?
Consider a firm whose stock is 100% owned by an individual.
Even if the firm is set up as a corporation with a board of directors, the firm will pursue the goal the only shareholder would
want it to pursue. This goal is not necessarily the maximization
of shareholder value or profit. In fact, Scott Morton and Podolny
show that privately-held wine producers maximize the utility of

27
28
29

And Coasian bargaining is unlikely to resolve the issue given free-rider problems.
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 19.
See Hart & Zingales, supra note 21; Broccardo et al., supra note 25.
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their major shareholders, not profits.30 Similarly, Shive and Forester show that privately-held companies curb pollution more
than publicly traded ones, consistent with the idea that they are
maximizing a different objective function.31
When the number of shareholders is more than one, however,
there are two layers of agency problems that make it difficult for
shareholders to get managers to maximize their welfare. The first
agency problem is between managers and shareholders. Corporate law delegates the business of running the corporation to directors. Directors have a fiduciary duty toward shareholders, but
they also have enormous discretion provided by the business judgment rule. This discretion makes it easy for directors to pursue
their own objectives. In contrast, there are two reasons why
shareholders cannot force managers to pursue their own agenda.
First, until very recently the SEC’s “ordinary business” exception
made it easy for the board to exclude from the proxy ballot any
resolution that requires managers to run the business in a particular way. Second, even if such a resolution were put on the ballot
and received majority approval, it would not be binding. A large
individual shareholder can easily force management to pursue
her own agenda by threatening to replace the board. It is much
harder for dispersed shareholders to do this.
Today most dispersed shareholders own their shares through
intermediaries such as BlackRock, Fidelity, and Vanguard. This
is where the second agency problem comes in. Both the ERISA
law regulating private pensions and standard practice have contributed to enshrining the idea that asset managers must support
only shareholder resolutions that increase the long-run financial
return of their clients.
Start with ERISA. To prevent abuses, the 1974 ERISA Law
required that a fiduciary should discharge his duties “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries.”32 The law did not specify whether these benefits
can also be non-pecuniary. Yet, in 2014 the Supreme Court stated
that, “[r]ead in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term ‘benefits’ in the provision just quoted must be understood to refer to
the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that

30 Fiona M. Scott Morton & Joel M. Podolny, Love or Money? The Effects of Owner
Motivation in the California Wine Industry, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 431 (2002).
31 Sophie A. Shive & Margaret M. Forster, Corporate Governance and Pollution Externalities of Public and Private Firms, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 1296 (2020).
32 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A).
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trustees who manage investments typically seek to secure for the
trust’s beneficiaries.”33
The ERISA Law applies to the pension managers of 401k
plans, e.g., Harvard University, not to the fund managers themselves. Nevertheless, there is an indirect effect on fund managers.
The fear of potential liability makes 401k plan managers reluctant to include in the investment options available to plan participants a fund that explicitly states that it will pursue goals other
than financial ones. Thus, any fund manager who wants to
achieve economies of scale would have little incentive to offer a
fund with a broader purpose since this runs the risk of being excluded from 401k plans.
In marketing themselves to investors, mutual funds face
some of the same concerns ERISA law tried to address: how to
commit credibly not to waste the investors’ money. Given the lack
of awareness of any possible interaction between a business purpose and a “philanthropic” one, mutual funds found it natural to
commit themselves to the “long-term economic interests” of their
clients, as the promotional material of BlackRock states.34
BlackRock is not alone. We looked at the governance guidelines
adopted by all the top 5 mutual fund families. Vanguard promises
“to serve as a voice for our investors and to promote long-term
value creation at the companies in which our funds invest.”35
State Street declares that it will “promote the long-term economic
value of client investments.”36 JPMorgan asserts that its guidelines have been developed “with the objective of encouraging corporate action that enhances shareholder value.”37 It is only Fidelity that states that the corporate board must focus “on protecting
the interests of shareholders” (without any qualification that the
interest must be only economic).38 When money has been raised

33 Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014). Some legal
scholars argue that SWM can be partially accommodated under current ERISA law. See,
e.g., David H. Webber, The Use And Abuse Of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106
(2014). For example, the Eleventh Circuit blessed a pension plan that offered below-market rate home loans to plan participants. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986).
34 BlackRock Investment Stewardship, BLACKROCK, https://perma.cc/UZ86-65DQ
(last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
35 VANGUARD, GLOBAL INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES (Nov. 2021),
https://perma.cc/UZ4L-3PVK.
36 STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, PROXY VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES (Mar.
2022), https://perma.cc/MN77-D8DS.
37 J.
P. MORGAN, GLOBAL PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (Apr. 2022),
https://perma.cc/6HAX-YH4M.
38 Stewardship Principles and Proxy Voting, FIDELITY, https://perma.cc/U2E4-RLS9
(last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
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under these premises, it is very difficult for an institutional investor to change course.
Besides the law and any existing contracts, a major role in
enforcing SVM is played by business norms. Directors are routinely confronted with complex business decisions. Unless they
are purely self-interested, they need some principle to guide
them. Decades of academic thinking, both in the law and in finance, have enshrined the idea that the fiduciary duty owed to
shareholders means the pursuit of shareholder value maximization. In other words, SVM has become the business norm.
As an example of how legal rules about SVM have affected
practice even outside the realm of their strict applicability, consider what Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, declared in 2016:
We live in a world where the Department of Labor gave us
this guidance about what is our fiduciary responsibility as
investors. We only have one responsibility as investors: to
maximize return. That’s it. So basically we can tell a company to fire five thousand employees tomorrow, and if that
maximizes return for the company we did something well. We
can tell that company to do something that maybe is bad for
the environment. There is nothing right now that guides,
other than a maximization of return behavior.”39
V. SHAREHOLDER WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
In this section we describe the objective of shareholder welfare maximization (SWM), and discuss how it can be implemented.
A. The Meaning of SWM
To explore SWM, we follow Hart and Zingales and Broccardo
et al. in the way we model socially responsible shareholders.40 We
suppose that, when making a decision, a shareholder puts weight
𝜆𝜖 0,1 on the welfare of others affected by the decision, where 𝜆
reflects her degree of social responsibility. Different shareholders
may have different 𝜆’s, with some perhaps having 𝜆=0 (they are
purely self-interested).
To see the implications of this, consider the Costco example
of Section III, where the issue is whether to stop the use of

39 Unusual Debate at Davos: Lobbying, Maximizing Shareholder Value and the Duty
of CEO’s, PROMARKET (April 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/2HEV-3QGW.
40 Hart & Zingales, supra note 21; Broccardo et al., supra note 25.
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antibiotics in raising chickens in order to reduce the risk of antibiotic resistance in the human population. For expositional purposes start with a very simple scenario. Suppose that Costco has
three shareholders, each of whom owns a third of the company,
with social responsibility parameters 𝜆1 , 𝜆2 , 𝜆3 , respectively. Assume that the additional cost of not using antibiotics is 120 and
the monetary benefit attached to the reduced risk in humans is
180. Now imagine that these shareholders have the opportunity
to vote on whether Costco should stop using antibiotics. Each
shareholder votes her preference, with the majority determining
the outcome. Then, according to our formulation shareholder i
(i=1,2,3) votes to stop if
(5.1)

40+𝜆 (180 80)>0,

where the first term represents the capital loss the shareholder
experiences herself if the extra cost of 120 is incurred, and the
second term represents the impact on others—the environmental
gain minus the capital loss incurred by her fellow shareholders—
multiplied by her social responsibility parameter 𝜆 . We can rewrite (5.1) as
(5.2)

𝜆 >2/5.

Thus, if at least two of the shareholders have 𝜆’s above 2/5, the
outcome of the vote will be to stop antibiotics, while if at least two
of the shareholders have 𝜆’s below 2/5 the outcome will be to maintain the status quo.
In principle, shareholder welfare maximization can mean
more than just majority rule. A natural approach is to follow Kaldor41 and Hicks42 and ask whether the winners could bribe the
losers to support stopping antibiotic use. Suppose that shareholder i receives a monetary transfer 𝑡 . Then (5.1) is replaced by
(5.3)

40+ 𝑡

𝜆 (180 80)>0.

Given that the 𝑡 ’s sum to zero, it is easy to see that (5.3) can be
satisfied for all shareholders if and only if
(5.4)

𝜆1 +𝜆2 +𝜆3 >6/5,

41 Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
42 J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
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which is just the sum of (5.2).
For future reference, it is useful to generalize the analysis.
Suppose Costco has n shareholders, where shareholder i has a
shareholding 𝑠 . Let 𝛿 be the cost of dropping antibiotics and h be
the value of the reduced risk to humans. Then, absent transfers,
shareholder i will vote to stop if

si  i (h  (1 si ) )  0 ,

(5.5)

where, as before, the first term represents the capital loss the
shareholder experiences herself, and the second term represents
the impact on others. (5.5) can be rewritten as

si (1 i )  i (h  )  0 .

(5.6)

Since the first term is negative, (5.6) can only be satisfied if
( h   )  0 , i.e. shareholders will only vote for something that is
socially efficient.
In this general formulation the Kaldor-Hicks criterion becomes
(5.7)

∑

𝑠𝛿

𝜆 ℎ

1

𝑠 𝛿 ]>0,

which, by the same logic, can only be satisfied if h> 𝛿.
Returning to the numerical example, it is interesting to observe what happens to voting decisions when the number of
shareholders increases. Suppose that there are 100 shareholders,
each of whom owns 1%. Then (5.1) becomes
(5.8)

1.2+𝜆 (180 118.8))>0,

since each shareholder’s personal capital loss is now only 1.2. As
there are more and more shareholders, with each holding a
smaller fraction of Costco—a situation that describes the world of
diversified investors that we see today—the first term converges
to zero and eventually all shareholders with a positive 𝜆 will vote
to stop the antibiotics.43 In other words a vote will lead to a socially efficient outcome as long as a majority of shareholders are
socially responsible and have a small holding in the company.
43 More generally, it follows from the results of Broccardo et al., supra note 25, that,
as shareholdings converge to zero, each shareholder with a positive 𝜆 will vote to stop the
antibiotics if and only if h> 𝛿, that is, doing so is socially efficient.
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The Costco situation may be one where, possibly with the
help of management, fairly reliable estimates of the cost 𝛿 and
the benefit h can be presented to shareholders. In other cases
there may be more disagreement about the facts, and in politicized contexts disagreements about what should enter h. For example, in the case of Mifeprex, pro-choice shareholders might assign a very high positive value to h, the benefit of making the pill
widely available, whereas anti-abortion shareholders may think
that h is large and negative. Under these conditions, voting may
not lead to a shareholder welfare maximizing outcome in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. Yet achieving the Kaldor-Hicks outcome would
require shareholders to report truthfully their 𝜆 ’s and their views
about h, something that they may not be willing to do. Whether
incentive compatible mechanisms can be devised to elicit preferences is an interesting topic for future research. In the meantime,
voting may be a reasonable second-best alternative, and we will
focus on this in what follows.44
B. Which Topics/Decisions?
One concern with SWM is that the set of controversies corporations may be pushed to be involved in potentially explodes.
Should corporations fight for animal rights, voting rights, gun
rights, diversity, etc.?
As the discussion and examples in Section III make clear,
SWM diverges from SVM when a company has a comparative advantage in achieving a social goal. Thus it seems reasonable to
limit shareholder engagement on social issues to such cases. Here
we provide the beginnings of a taxonomy concerning when comparative advantage is likely to exist and when it is not.
A natural case of comparative advantage occurs when a company controls a unique technology of production that cannot easily be reversed. We already described examples of this in Section
III: a company that produces plastic waste as a by-product of ecommerce, or a company that uses antibiotics in raising chickens.
As another, in 1984 DuPont faced a choice between polluting the
Ohio river with a toxic substance known as PFOA and investing

44 For a different justification of the desirability of voting, see Adi Libson, Taking
Shareholders’ Social Preferences Seriously: Confronting a New Agency Problem, 9 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 699 (2019). Libson argues that social decisions should be delegated to
shareholders given that managers’ human capital is nondiversified and as a result managers will not be inclined to promote social initiatives.
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in incineration. Dupont decided not to incinerate, an action that
shareholders could not easily undo.45
A second case of comparative advantage occurs when a company has some market power. Along the lines of the Danco example in Section III, consider a producer of a day-after abortion pill.
Unless the market for these pills is perfectly competitive, a
change in supply can have an effect on the price of the pill and
thus on the number of people using it. It would be difficult, for
free-rider reasons, to assemble a group to offset what the firm is
doing by buying back pills in the marketplace (if the group wants
to reduce abortions) or by subsidizing them (if the group wants to
increase access to abortion). In this sense, the producer has a comparative advantage in determining supply and influencing the
price.
As another example in this category, consider a pharmaceutical company that produces a scarce vaccine. Profit maximation
might lead to a very high price for the vaccine, but socially responsible shareholders may prefer that the company make the
vaccine widely available at a lower price.
A third case of comparative advantage involves political pressure. In 2015 Indianapolis-based Angie’s List announced it was
canceling a $40 million headquarters expansion in protest against
the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
which opponents claim was targeted against LGBT people.46 The
protest led to an amendment of the RFRA that provided protections for LGBT customers, employees, and tenants. Individuals
do not have the same power. Unless they can perfectly coordinate
their actions, the threat of many small firms is not as powerful as
the threat of a firm employing many people. Note that a large
business can often exercise this threat at no cost since they get
what they want and they do not have to move, something that a
collection of small firms would find it very hard to achieve.
As a final example, let us return to corporate charitable donations. As noted in Section III, this is often regarded as a slamdunk case for Friedman’s argument that companies should leave
social matters to shareholders. In fact, the conclusion is not so
obvious. Under classical economic assumptions, when an individual gives to charity—a contribution that, say, will save the life of
a starving child—the individual trades off the marginal cost of
giving against the marginal benefit she receives from saving the
45

See Shapira & Zingales supra note 18.
Tim Evans, Angie’s List Canceling Eastside Expansion Over RFRA, INDYSTAR
(Mar. 28, 2015, 11:47 AM ET), https://perma.cc/RBH2-8EBG.
46
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child, ignoring the marginal benefit others receive from there being one less starving child. But this leads to the undersupply of
charity from a social perspective. In contrast, if a majority of
shareholders vote for a company to give to charity, all shareholders are forced to make contributions. This amplification effect can
push charitable contributions closer to the social optimum.
However, there is a countervailing force. Consider the
founder(s) of the company at the IPO stage. Rather than setting
up the company in such a way that it can make future charitable
contributions, the founder can create two companies: one that
does business but is prohibited from giving to charity and the
other that is a charitable foundation. The charitable foundation
would be funded by some fraction of the extra amount that investors are willing to pay for the shares of the first company given
that there will be no outflows to charity (the fraction depends on
how prosocial the founder herself is; if she is selfish she will
pocket all of the extra amount). Under reasonable assumptions,
one can show that the two-company alternative is at least as good
as and sometimes strictly better than the one-company alternative for the founder. For this reason, preventing shareholders
from voting on purely charitable activities can be justified.
While we have provided examples where a shareholder vote
seems legitimate, we do not want to suggest that our views are
sacrosanct. A company should be free to limit by charter which
social issues are allowed on (or which ones are excluded from) the
proxy ballot. Also, firms with political power or large market
power are relatively rare. Thus, the vast majority of issues that
would need to be voted on pertain to situations where there is a
technological interaction between the prosocial and business activities of a corporation. We will discuss further possible restrictions in Section V.D.
C. Voting in Practice
Most investors own stock via a financial intermediary, generally a mutual fund. Currently, these institutions vote on behalf of
their investors, almost universally taking the view that they have
a fiduciary duty to vote for the value-maximizing outcome. But
shareholders can become more involved in the voting process, and
that seems to be happening.
At least three approaches are possible. The first one is to push
down the voting decision to the level of individual investors. This
is a strategy that BlackRock is trying to implement now with its
major investors. Thus, if the New York State Common
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Retirement Fund invests in BlackRock S&P500 ETF, it will have
the right to vote pro-rata the shares it indirectly owns in all the
S&P500 companies.
This strategy might work well for major pension funds and
endowments, but it is unreasonable for individual shareholders.
We cannot expect shareholders to express an opinion on all ballots
of all the companies they own. This was hard to imagine in a
world where investors owned just a few stocks. It is inconceivable
today when most investors buy indexed mutual funds, which own
hundreds if not thousands of stocks. Proxy ballot advisors employ
an army of analysts to provide guidelines on how mutual funds
should cast their votes in corporate ballots. It would be enormously inefficient to expect every single investor to duplicate that
effort.
Fortunately, there is a solution. Today many institutional investors buy proxy advising services customized to specific needs.
For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has six sets
of “specialty” proxy voting guidelines—each geared toward a specific special interest group: Taft-Hartley Advisory Services, Public Fund, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), Catholic FaithBased, Sustainability, Climate. Each set of guidelines is 70-80
pages long and describes in excruciating detail how the vote
would be cast in different contingencies. In this sense, it is a much
more detailed version of a party electoral platform. Thus, it would
be relatively simple for each investor to choose one type of guideline and ask that her shares be voted accordingly. The main objection to this approach is that it limits investors’ choice to the
pre-determined specialty policies available in the market. Yet, in
the long run, if proxy advisors are paid on the basis of the number
of clients who choose to follow their advice, competition is likely
to lead to a broad range of “political platforms.”
The second strategy would be for mutual funds to elicit investors’ preferences and then cast their votes based on an aggregation of these preferences. As we have noted, this may be challenging since shareholders may not report their preferences
truthfully. While it may be possible to develop incentive-compatible mechanisms to deal with this, a shortcut would be for mutual
funds to ask their investors how they would vote and then aggregate these votes.
The third strategy is for mutual funds companies to offer investors funds with a very clear and predetermined voting strategy
and let investors choose among them. For example, Vanguard
could offer an S&P500 light green fund, ready to vote in favor of
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all shareholder resolutions that promote a greener economy, as
long as their cost of reducing CO2 emission does not exceed $100
per ton. Vanguard could also offer an S&P500 dark green fund
that votes in favor of all shareholder resolutions that promote a
greener economy, as long as their cost of reducing CO2 emission
does not exceed $200 per ton.
Voting strategies become more complex when one moves beyond simple Yes/No decisions. Consider Costco’s use of antibiotics. Perhaps the issue is whether to eliminate them; moderate
their use; or do nothing. We know from Arrow that preference aggregation runs into difficulties when there are more than two alternatives,47 but political elections take place in spite of Arrow’s
result. Certainly, the current electoral system can be improved
and many scholars have proposed valid alternatives, like rankedchoice voting, or methods to select the Condorcet winner.48 These
methods could also be applied in the corporate context.
D. Opening the Floodgates
One possible objection to SWM is that it would open the floodgates to thousands of shareholder resolutions that will dominate
shareholder meetings and distract management from creating
value. Before we address this concern it is important to review
where we stand today. Tallarita analyzes all shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues for the period from
2010 to 2019 at companies included in the S&P 500 index.49 He
finds 2,410 proposals.50 Thus, on average S&P500 companies receive less than half a proposal a year. 19% of the proposals are
successfully excluded by the company, and so the average company in the S&P500 will have to vote on a shareholder proposal
every three years.51
The distribution of proposals per company is not uniform.
During the sample period, Exxon received on average 7.5 proposals a year, while companies in the bottom quartile of the distribution of proposals receive less than one proposal in 10 years.52
Companies outside the S&P500 index are likely to receive fewer

47 See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale
Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2012).
48 See, e.g., Eric Maskin, Arrow’s Theorem, May’s Axioms, and Borda’s Rule (Mar.
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/GZV4-LBR8.
49 Roberto Tallarita, Stockholder Politics, 73 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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proposals than the bottom quartile of the S&P500 index.53 Thus,
for the vast majority of companies shareholder propositions are
not an issue. Consistent with Section V.A, the issue is concentrated in a few companies that have disproportionate political or
market power.
Filters for shareholder resolutions can also be employed. Currently, there are three. The first is the amount of stock required
to file a proposal. Under Rule 14a–8 any shareholder who held at
least $25,000 worth of the company’s stock continuously for at
least one year before the date the proposal is submitted (or $2,000
for three years) can file a proposal. If shareholder activism leads
to too many proposals this requirement could be strengthened.
The second filter is that companies can request from the SEC
a no-action letter if they exclude the proposal from the ballot. In
Tallarita’s sample, management tried to exclude the proposal
from the proxy statement in 39% of the cases and it succeeded
approximately half the time (49.6%).54 Thus, the SEC does represent an important filter. The question is what it is filtering on. In
the past the principle has been that a proposal that involves “ordinary business” matters is inappropriate. Thus, a proposal advanced at Walmart to reconsider the sale of automatic weapons
was blocked because it concerned the ordinary business decision:
what to sell.55 As we have seen, the most relevant proposals are
precisely those that pertain to the business of a company and thus
they risk being filtered out. But the SEC could adopt a different
rule: allow only proposals that pertain to a company’s comparative advantage.56
The third filter is represented by the fact that all these proposals are precatory. Thus, there is no legal obligation for companies to follow them.57 In fact, one can think about these ballots as
a way to elicit shareholders’ preferences, leaving to management
the final decision about what to do given those preferences. Our
view is that it would be better to make shareholder resolutions

53

Id.
Id.
55 Clare O’Connor, Walmart Beats Out Church in Court Fight over Gun Sales,
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2015, 1:35 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/F4YU-PCMF.
56 On November 3, 2021, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, providing a
more nuanced interpretation of the ordinary business exception, which is likely to result
in the exclusion of fewer shareholder proposals. We are grateful to Jill Fisch for alerting
us to this change.
57 As we stated above, shareholders could threaten to replace directors who do not
implement their precatory proposals. Yet, this is much more easily done by large institutional investors than by individual investors.
54
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binding since this would make it easier for shareholders to get
managers to do what they want. However, if the main reason to
oppose the SWM approach is the fear of making corporations ungovernable, having a transitory period where proposals remain
precatory may make sense.
In sum, we believe that there are sufficient mechanisms
available to prevent a dangerous floodgate of shareholder proposals in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Corporations are larger, more complex, and more powerful
than they were in 1970. In a more populous world, the importance
of externalities has also greatly increased. Finally, the preferences of investors have changed. Investors, especially younger
ones, are more sensitive to social issues. In spite of all these
changes, the view on the proper objective of a business enterprise
does not seem to have adapted.
In this paper, we have suggested that it should. We have argued that, when externalities are important and investors are at
least somewhat prosocial, shareholder welfare maximization not
value maximization is an appropriate goal. The standard defenses of SVM are untenable. SWM is what shareholders want
and it is implementable. We outline several ways to achieve this.
Interestingly, some of these are being adopted as we write. This
is an area where practice is ahead of theory. In this paper, we
have tried to fill the gap.

